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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: The Remaking of Takings
Law and the Re-emergence of Lochner
JERRY MITCHELL*
Yesterday the active area in this field was concerned with "prop-
erty." Today it is "civil liberties." Tomorrow it may be again be
"6property."
Justice Frankfurter (1955) 1
Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse.
Justice Blackmun, dissent in Lucas
2
INTRODUCTION
Justice Frankfurter was prophetic. Justice Blackmun may be
as well. Starting in the late 1970's, the Supreme Court turned
increasing attention to private property rights and began reformu-
lating the application of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause to
government regulations.' Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice
* Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic
University; Ph.D., 1986, University of Michigan; J.D., 1975, University of Illinois; B.S.,
1972, University of Illinois.
' Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in OF LAw AND MEN,
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 3, 19 (Philip Elman ed., 1956).
' Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2904 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
' The major cases include MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477
U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Kirby Forest Indus-
tries v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Lake Country Estates Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); An-
drus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978). The 1987 triumvirate includes: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
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majority, created a new categorical takings rule in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council." Owners must now be compensated if
their land has been deprived of "all economically beneficial use"
by government regulations.5 The rule applies whether the regula-
tory taking is temporary or permanent and regardless of the legis-
lative purpose involved.6 The majority also created an exception to
the new rule that echoes the Lochner v. New York7 era of con-
servative judicial activism based on substantive due process: such
regulations can only be sustained if their limitations are already
present in the state's law of property and nuisance.8
Lucas should be seen as the third case emerging from the
Rehnquist Supreme Court that seeks, through extensive reinter-
pretation, to remake the judicial application of the Takings Clause
to environmental and land use regulations. In First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held, for the first time in the
Court's history, that a finding of a regulatory taking requires com-
pensation.9 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Justice
Scalia, in a now famous footnote to the majority opinion, sug-
gested that the Takings Clause requires heightened judicial scru-
tiny.10 These two decisions, in conjunction with the third takings
case of the 1987 term, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis,'t provide a critical context for reviewing Lucas and
will be discussed in part I. of this article.
As is often the case in the enunciation of new categorical
rules, Lucas raises more questions than it settles. The case pro-
duced two acrimonious dissents by Justices Blackmun and Stevens
that question each step of the majority's analysis, 2 a concurrence
by Justice Kennedy that rejects much of the substance of the ma-
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987). The Court also addressed mobile home rent control ordinances as
possible takings in Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992); Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. 2886.
Id. at 2894.
o Id.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895; see infra part VI. for a discussion of the re-emergence of
Lochner.
9 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
10 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987).
" 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
" 112 S.Ct. at 2904, 2917.
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jority opinion, 13 and a statement by Justice Souter in which he
indicates both that the case should not have been heard and that
the rule and its exception may be unsound.1 4 The Court appears to
be split five to four regarding the new categorical rule and excep-
tion. Part II. and the succeeding sections of this article address
the debate through each step of the majority decision.
On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied a
very narrow reading of the majority opinion.' 5 It held that the
Coastal Council had to demonstrate support for the restrictions in
the state's common law. Since support could not be shown, a tak-
ing was found, and the case was remanded to a trial court on the
sole issue of determining damages.' Curiously, the court also held
that the temporary taking extended from the date the statute went
into effect until the date of its "Order on Remand.' The court
did not set out the test to be used in determining actual damages.
The following review of the context of the Lucas decision and
of the specific findings suggests that the result reached by the
South Carolina Supreme Court was not inevitable and was based
on the narrowest possible reading of the decision. It is doubtful
that many states will follow this path in the future. The possible
directions open to state courts in the future and the confusion that
will result from this decision should become apparent.
I. THE 1987 TAKINGS DECISIONS
The application of the Takings Clause to governmental ac-
tions and regulations has never been entirely settled.1 8 Prior to
1922, the clause had been applied only to government actions that
constituted an actual physical appropriation of some type. 19 That
limited application changed with Holmes' famous decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in which he declared that "while
" Id. at 2902.
4 Id. at 2925.
10 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, order on remand, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C.
1992).
I d. at 486.
I d.
For historical overview, see CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A. WOLF, LAND USE
PLANNING 777-924 (4th ed. 1989); DANIEL MANDELKER. LAND USE LAW 19-54 (2d ed.
1988); JAMES W. ELY. JR.. THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992).
'" See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 18; MANDELKER, supra note 18.
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property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking. "20
The full review of the takings issue following the Holmes de-
cision is beyond the scope of this article. However, despite various
interpretations of his meaning, certain principles were actually de-
veloped by state and federal courts that guided takings jurispru-
dence prior to 1987.21 Although the term "taking" was applied
both to physical appropriations and regulations which had gone
too far, the power of eminent domain and the police power were
clearly distinguished. A physical taking could be partial and was
an exercise of eminent domain requiring compensation. No review
or balance with the governmental purpose was required. Govern-
ment regulations were exercises of the police power, could only
occur in relation to the whole of the property, and therefore, could
not be partial. The appropriate remedy for a regulatory taking
was invalidation, and the purpose of the regulation was an impor-
tant consideration. 2
In Keystone, the Court followed accepted takings law in a
five to four decision delivered by Justice Stevens." The Court up-
held new requirements for coal companies in Pennsylvania to
leave fifty percent of the coal below structures or watercourses to
avoid subsidence. In setting these new requirements, the Court
distinguished the case from Mahon24 on the basis of the broader
public purposes served by the new legislation and the fact that
economically-beneficial mining was not rendered impossible by the
regulations.2 In holding that the company's twenty-seven million
tons of coal (two percent of the total) that were required to be
kept in place did not constitute a separate property interest sub-
ject to a taking, the Court followed the position enunciated in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City:26
20 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
21 See FRED BOSSELMAN. ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1973) for a full review of ac-
cepted principles at that time; see also Robert H. Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equa-
tion: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Paris, 15 URB. LAW. 447 (1983).
2 Id. Robert Freilich makes this point perhaps more strongly than the other general
reviews with the exception of Norman Williams, Jr., et al., The White River Junction
Manifesto, 9 VT. L REV. 193 (1984).
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
2, 260 U.S. 393.
22 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484-97.
22 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particu-
lar segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
2 7
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the four dissenters, would not
have distinguished the case and would have treated the coal as a
separate property interest subject to taking and, thus, compensa-
ble.28 The dissent may now claim a majority of the Court. The
impacts of this view, in light of Justice Scalia's footnote on this
issue, are discussed in part V. 29
In First English, the Court essentially held that time delays
due to regulations later invalidated as excessive were severable in-
terests in property and that such temporary regulatory takings
must be compensated. 0 The case arose after the church was de-
nied permission to rebuild in a floodway following the destruction
of its buildings by a flood. 3' The church brought an inverse con-
demnation action for compensation, and the California Supreme
Court denied review of an appellate decision holding that compen-
sation was not the appropriate remedy to be pursued in a chal-
lenge to a regulation."2 The Supreme Court took the case on the
sole issue of whether compensation was the required remedy for a
regulatory taking. In a decision that equated physical and regula-
tory takings without explanation, the Court held that compensa-
tion was required.3" Because of the posture of the case, the Court
was not required to determine if a taking had occurred and re-
manded that issue to the state courts." ' The California Court of
Appeals promptly held that no taking had taken place because the
regulation was a reasonable moratoria for a reasonable period of
time, had not taken all use of the property, and directly protected
27 480 U.S. at 497.
28 Id. at 506-21.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
30 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
31 Id.
2 See First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258
Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989).
33 482 U.S. at 306. The decision implements the dissent of Justice Brennan in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981).
14 482 U.S. at 304.
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the public health and safety. 5 The Supreme Court decision has
yielded much criticism and little compensation.3
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,7 the Court ap-
plied the determination of Agins v: City of Tiburon"8 that the
Takings Clause is violated by a regulation which "does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner ec-
onomically viable use of his land."' 9 Nollan is the only decision to
find a taking based on the first prong of this two-prong test. The
decision invalidated a requirement by the California Coastal
Commission that the Nollans provide a public easement across
their property because the requirement did not have a reasonable
nexus to a legitimate public purpose. The case is best known for
Justice Scalia's footnote suggestion that heightened scrutiny is
necessary in the application of the Takings Clause to
regulations."'
II. THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF LUCAS
The United States is increasingly a coastal nation. According
to the 1990 census, fifty percent of our population currently re-
sides within fifty miles of the coast, and that percentage is pro-
jected to increase to seventy-five percent by 2010." An increasing
amount of upscale residential development, heavily subsidized by
the National Flood Insurance Program, has been built on the
twenty-seven hundred miles of barrier islands along the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts.4 2 At the federal level, concern for overdevelop-
" First English, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
"6 See MANDELKER, supra note 18; Charles Siemon & Wendy U. Larsen, The Taking
Issue Triology: The Beginning of the End? 33 WASH. U J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 169
(1988); John P. Lodise, Retroactive Compensation and the Illusion of Economic Effi-
ciency: An Analysis of the First English Decision, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1988).
37 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987).
38 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
'a Nollon, 483 U.S. at 836-42.
*O See id. at 834-35 n.3. Contra Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rational-
ity, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part 1), 23 URB. LAW 301
(1991) (providing an excellent review of Nollan and indicating that Justice Scalia is just
plain wrong regarding heightened scrutiny, that the decision has caused confusion and a
variety of results, and that the decision can make sense as establishing the requirement for
a rational nexus between exactions and public purposes).
11 Marya Morris, Building on the Beach, ENV'T & DEV. (Am. Plan. Ass'n), Sept.
1992, at 1.
11 See Mike Donovan, Government Subsidy of Coastal Barrier Development, I J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 271 (1985); see also Rutherford H. Platt, Congress and the
Coast, 27 ENV'T 14 (1985).
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ment of barrier islands has led to the establishment of new Na-
tional Seashores, the Coastal Barrier Resource System, and some
reformulation of the National Flood Insurance Program."'
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) pro-
vided financial and federal consistency incentives for states to im-
plement new coastal planning in order to control the degradation
and overdevelopment of the coast. 4' The South Carolina Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1977 provided a framework for plan-
ning and designated a narrow "critical area" within which the
construction of any habitable structure was prohibited.' 5 These in-
itial programs did not prove to be sufficient. In 1980, Congress
amended the CZMA, directing states to strengthen their pro-
grams by "preventing or significantly reducing threats to life and
the destruction of property by eliminating development and rede-
velopment in high-hazard areas."'1
6
In 1986, the South Carolina Coastal Council appointed a spe-
cial committee on beachfront management, and their 1987 report
led to the 1988 Beachfront Management Act (Act). 4 7 The Act
extended the "critical area" by creating a baseline along the pri-
mary dune and a forty-year erosion control setback line landward
of the baseline." This amendment to the South Carolina Coastal
Management Act, thus, extended the area covered by the original
building ban and also prohibited the rebuilding of any structures
within the area that might be completely or nearly destroyed.' 9 In
41 See Platt, supra note 42, at 15-17, 34-35; Donovan, supra note 42, at 277-81; see
also Harold J. Creely, Jr., Note, Barrier Islands: The Conflict Between Federal Programs
that Promote Development, 33 SC L REV. 373, 373-86 (1981-82).
" Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 89-454, § 302, 86 Stat. 1280
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464 (1988))[hereinafter CZMA].
45 S.C. CODE ANN. §§48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
46 CZMA § 302, 16 U.S.C. §1456b(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1990); see also Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2904-05 (1992)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
48 Id. at § 48-39-280 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
' The fact that the 1988 Act did not create, but merely extended, a ban that was in
effect at the time Lucas bought the property may be important in determining whether his
investment-backed expectations were reasonable. The majority opinion does not address
this point except to note that in 1986, the critical area did not include the Lucas lots, and
he was "not legally obliged to obtain a permit from the Council." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at
2889. However, for about half of the last 40 years the lots may have been partially in the
critical area and, in any case, he may have been put on constructive notice of the potential
for regulatory change. This issue is discussed in part III., infra, and although it did arise
on remand of this case, the investment-backed expectations aspect of the takings issue has
not been eliminated for future decisions by the majority holding.
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1990, the Act was amended to allow some construction under spe-
cial circumstances.
60
Lucas is a contractor, manager, and part owner of develop-
ments on the barrier island east of Charleston known as the Isle of
Palms and has lived there since 1978. In 1986, he bought two
remaining lots in one development for $975,000 with the apparent
intention of developing them as home sites.51 However, these sites
are located in a very unstable area. As Justice Blackmun pointed
out in his dissent:
In roughly half of the last 40 years, all or part of petitioner's
property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb
and flow of the tide. Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner's prop-
erty was under water. Between 1963 and 1973 the shoreline was
100 to 150 feet onto petitioner's property. In 1973 the first line
of stable vegetation was about halfway through the property.
Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms issued 12 emergency
orders for sandbagging to protect property in the Wild Dune de-
velopment. Determining that local habitable structures were in
imminent danger of collapse, the Council issued permits for two
rock revetments to protect condominium developments near peti-
tioner's property from erosion; one of the revetments extends
more than halfway onto one of his lots. 2
The passage of the 1988 Beachfront Management Act placed
both lots in the critical area. At that time, the Act provided no
exceptions to the construction ban." Lucas declined to challenge
the setback lines, did not file for permits or take any other admin-
istrative actions, and did not challenge the validity of the Beach
Management Act as a lawful exercise of the State's police
power.54 Instead, he filed suit in the South Carolina courts, argu-
ing that the Act completely extinguished the value of his property
and, therefore, entitled him to compensation under First En-
glish.55 Without distinguishing among the bundle of rights held by
Lucas, the trial court held that the Act deprived Lucas of any
" See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-290 to -300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). As discussed
infra at text accompanying note 58, Lucas could probably build homes after 1990, which
makes the issue one of taking and compensation for the 1988-90 period.
" Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889.
id. at 2905 (Blackmum, J., dissenting).
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
" See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2905-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2890.
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"reasonable economic use of the lots" and awarded him $1.2
million. "6
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision. It
held that the State had the power to prevent any harmful use of
property, that a state statute was entitled to a presumption of con-
stitutionality, and that the court was bound by the legislative find-
ing that "discouraging new construction in close proximity to the
beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm.
57
In upholding a construction ban on permanent structures in an
unstable and potentially dangerous area, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court decision appears very similar to the holding of the
California Court of Appeals on remand in First English." How-
ever, because the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the de-
cision on the basis of uncontested legislative findings, it did not,
apparently, see any necessity for review of the trial court's deter-
mination that the property was rendered totally valueless.
Due to the 1990 amendments to the Beachfront Management
Act that would have allowed some construction, Lucas could have
applied for a permit to build after 1990 and during the period of
state litigation.6 9 The South Carolina Supreme Court, in reversing
the case on the basis of the statute, declined to review a case for a
temporary takings claim that Lucas had not made.60
III. THE DETERMINATION TO REVIEW
The posture of the case split the Supreme Court six to three
on whether it should even be heard. Essentially, the majority, and
Justice Kennedy in concurrence, held that the case must be heard
under First English because the temporary takings claim could
not otherwise be made.6 It is important to note that the posture
of the case places the Court in the same position it was in when
deciding First English. Because the trial court's determination
that the property was valueless had not been reviewed below, the
5 Id. at 2890.
,' Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991), rev'd,
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
" See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893 (1989).
g9 S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
go See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898-99.
" Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2891; see also First English, 482 U.S. at 304 (holding that
temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the Takings Clause).
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Court could again enunciate a new test and remand the vital de-
terminations to the state court. Thus, the majority opinion
"leave[s] for decision on remand, of course, the questions left
unaddressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court as a conse-
quence of its categorical disposition." '62 Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence, was more explicit:
The finding appears to presume that the property has no signifi-
cant market value or resale potential. This is a curious finding,
and I share the reservations of some of my colleagues about a
finding that a beach front lot loses all value because of a devel-
opment restriction .... While the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina on remand need not consider the case subject to this con-
straint, we must accept the finding as entered below.8 3
Because the decision assumed an injury-in-fact and the de-
gree of that injury, the South Carolina courts were left in a simi-
lar position as the California courts in First English. They could
have avoided applying the Supreme Court's new test by finding
that the property was not rendered temporarily valueless, either
because it still had value under the law or because Lucas could
not prove specific losses resulting from the two-year imposition of
the ban. Justice Kennedy clearly implied that the state courts had
a basis to find that no taking occurred. Regarding the temporary
taking, Justice Blackmun commented that "[ailmost certainly it
did not happen in this case," '64 and Justice Stevens suggested that
"on the present record it is entirely possible that petitioner has
suffered no injury-in-fact even if the state statute was unconstitu-
tional when he filed this lawsuit.""S
The posture of this case and the differentiation in First En-
glish between a temporary regulatory taking and "normal delays
in obtaining building permits . . . and the like""6 suggest a possi-
ble method by which local and state governments, contemplating
construction bans, may avoid the finding of a taking requiring
compensation, even if a narrow reading of Lucas is applied. Fol-
lowing First English, temporary moratoria have been upheld if
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2892.
3 Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 2917-18 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
80 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
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they are reasonable and exist for a reasonable period of time.67 If
construction bans in or along such areas as the coast, floodways,
wetlands, etc. are initially labelled as temporary moratoria pend-
ing further study, it would be very difficult for a plaintiff to prove
a temporary regulatory taking even if the regulation was held to
have gone too far. On the other hand, we may be moving into a
period of review in which the determinations of the legislature re-
ceive little weight.
The majority determined to hear the case because the South
Carolina Supreme Court reached the merits and denied review of
the temporary takings claim.68 Apparently, a remand to recon-
sider the trial court's determination of total deprivation of value
was not considered. Justices Blackmun and Stevens both opined
that the case should not have been heard because there had not
been the necessary final determination below. 9 Justice Souter, in
a strongly-worded statement, indicated the confusion that the pos-
ture of the case is likely to engender:
Because the questionable conclusion of total deprivation cannot
be reviewed, the Court is precluded from attempting to clarify
the concept of total (and, in the Court's view, categorically com-
pensable) taking on which it rests .... Because that concept is
left uncertain, so is the significance of the exceptions to the com-
pensation requirement that the Court proceeds to recognize.7 0
In addition to the confusion likely to be created by a decision
that establishes a test but does not directly apply it, the decision
may also encourage new forms of litigation. Prior to First English
and Lucas, plaintiffs normally had to exhaust administrative rem-
edies before challenging regulations, and this procedure normally
included applications for permits or variances."1 Lucas appears to
17 See First English, 258 Cal.Rptr. 893, 906 (1989); Linda Bozung & Deborah J.
Alessi, Recent Developments in Environmental Preservation and the Rights of Property
Owners, 20 URB. LAW. 969, 970 (1988).
"8 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2891-92. "We think these considerations would be precluded
from review had the South Carolina Supreme Court rested its judgment on ripeness." Id.
at 2891.
69 Id. at 2906, 2917; see MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.
340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
7o Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2925.
71 The Supreme Court was, in fact, quite insistent on this point between Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636
(1980), which prompted the interest in compensable regulatory takings, and First English
1993-941
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have been rewarded in this decision for his failure to challenge the
new setbacks, apply for permits, or challenge the legislative find-
ings. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter all noted the appar-
ent eagerness of the majority to hear the case. On remand, Lucas
was rewarded not only for failing to apply for permits initially,
but also for failing to apply for permits following the 1990 amend-
ments to the statute. The result is not in line with past prudence
in addressing the underlying constitutional issues and may en-
courage facial challenges to regulations that give rise to compen-
sation without administrative hearings or record.
IV. THE NEW CATEGORICAL RULE
After disposing of the review issue, Justice Scalia acknowl-
edged that following Justice Holmes' decision in Mahon, in "70-
odd years of succeeding regulatory takings jurisprudence, we have
generally eschewed any set formula for determining how far is too
far, preferring to engage in .. .essentially ad hoc inquiries. 7' He
then declared that physical invasions and regulation which deny
all economically-beneficial or productive use of land are two
exceptions:
73
As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment
is violated when land use regulation does not substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests OR DENIES AN OWNER EC-
ONOMICALLY VIABLE USE OF HIS LAND.
74
It is important to note that Justice Scalia gave only the second
part of the Agins two-part test emphasis and effect as a categori-
cal rule. The test was enunciated before regulatory takings were
held to be compensable, and the first part of the test has been
generally seen as equivalent to the due process standard for gov-
ernmental regulations. Thus, to give both parts effect in this new
context would require the anomalous result that failure to advance
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); see also, Wil-
liamson County, 473 U.S. 172; MacDonald, 477 U.S. 340.
7 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893 (quoting Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
73 Id.
7" Id. at 2893-94. Justice Scalia cites Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 855 (1980),
as the basis for this position.
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a legitimate state interest would lead categorically to compensat-
ing a plaintiff. 5
Justices Blackmun and Stevens attacked the categorical rule
as contradicting the history of takings jurisprudence, which has
always required factual inquiry in the case of regulations." For
this point, they could have cited Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Court in Yee v. City of Escondido,77 delivered just two months
prior to Lucas:
Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of prop-
erty (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally re-
quires compensation . . . But where the government merely
regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if
considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or the ex-
tent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of the
property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled out the
property owners to bear a burden that should be borne by the
public as a whole .... The first category of cases requires courts
to apply a clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex fac-
tual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of govern-
ment actions. 71
The decision in Yee would seem to support the dissenting posi-
tions by Blackmun and Stevens that regulatory takings jurispru-
dence has always required specific factual inquiries, weighing, and
the findings that non-noxious uses have been banned by legislative
determinations. The careful weighing of interests in April seems
to have become a categorical rule in June.
The majority opinion proposed several justifications for the
categorical rule. The first was based on Justice Brennan's dissent
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego" that sug-
gested, from a landowner's point of view, that total deprivation is
the equivalent of a physical appropriation."0 Justice Steven's dis-
sent suggested one problem with this justification: the regulatory
diminution of fifty percent is, from the landowner's perspective,
the equivalent of a fifty-percent physical condemnation, but we
"8 See Kayden supra note 39 for the history of this part of the Agins formulation and
difficulties in applying Nollan as a result.
" Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2904-25.
7 112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992).
71 Id. at 1526.
79 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1980).
11 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2894.
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have never required compensation for regulatory diminution of
value. 81 This problem of equating regulatory takings and physical
takings derives from the flawed analysis in First English. Ration-
ally, if the Takings Clause is to have meaning, partial physical
takings must be covered. However, if regulation in the public in-
terest is to be possible, partial regulatory takings cannot be
compensated.
The majority opinion addressed the functional concern that
the government could not go on diminishing values in property
without compensation, noting that the concern "does not apply to
the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a
landowner of all economically beneficial uses." 82 It is certainly
true that the categorical rule may not widely affect the power of
government to regulate land use, and this proposition is the one
aspect of the case that many commentators have cited to indicate
that Lucas may not have overly-detrimental effects on environ-
mental and land use regulations.8 3 But the fact that the case may
not have broad application does not answer the question of
whether this class of regulations should be seen as violating the
Takings Clause or the question of the potential long-term effect of
holding any regulations to be per se compensable takings of
property.
In perhaps the strongest argument for the rule, the Court as-
serted that in cases where the owner is left without economically-
beneficial use, a heightened risk exists that private property is be-
ing pressed into public service.8 4 Justice Stevens would look to the
generality of application to determine if property owners are being
singled out.88 Additionally, it would seem unnecessary to add a
categorical rule to ad hoc factual inquiries to test the heightened
risk.
Perhaps the most important immediate result of this case is
the development of this categorical rule to be applied to the rare
cases of regulations that deprive owners of an economically-benefi-
cial use. The possible expansion of this rule depends on the defini-
8' Id. at 2920.
82 Id. at 2894.
" Plan. & L. Newsl. (Am. Plan. Ass'n), Oct. 1992; Q. Newsl. Envtl. L. (Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund), Summer 1992.
84 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895.
85 Id. at 2920.
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tion of the property being considered in determining such depriva-
tion and is considered below.
V. PARTIAL REGULATORY TAKINGS
As he did in Nollan88 Justice Scalia sets out a critical obser-
vation in footnote seven, placed immediately after the enunciation
of the categorical rule, with the potential to greatly expand the
Court's opinion:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our deprivation of all eco-
nomically feasible use rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the property interest against which the
loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a regulation
requires a developer to leave ninety percent of a rural tract in its
natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situa-
tion as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economi-
cally beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as
one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value
of the tract as a whole.
87
In the remainder of the footnote, Justice Scalia criticizes Penn
Central8 8 and Keystone.89 Prior to the footnote, it would have ap-
peared settled that, regarding regulations, one looked to the entire
parcel; cases of total deprivation of economically beneficial use
would, therefore, be rare. A wetlands regulation might provide,
for example, for ninety percent to be set aside and allow some
development of the remaining ten percent. If the Court breaks the
parcel into parts, then any regulation can become a compensable
taking through some ingenuity of the landowner. One could, for
example, sell off parcels for several years, buy a remaining two
lots, and argue that any regulation that bans development of
structures on them is a compensable taking.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that such scenarios
seem to be the intent of the footnote. It is hard to tell in what
direction the Court will go if such cases reach it. On the one hand,
the Court has changed since Keystone, and that case would proba-
bly not be decided the same today. On the other hand, the interest
in the coal would seem more capable of meaningful separation,
He See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2894.
8 See supra text accompanying note 26.
8 See supra text accompanying note 23.
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given the context of the case, than wetlands or beach area of a
larger parcel. This aspect of the case might best be approached
through consideration of investment backed expectations,90 a con-
cept that Justice Kennedy relies on in place of the categorical rule
and exception of the majority and which is peripherally discussed
throughout the decision.
In Nollan, Justice Scalia was just plain wrong to assert that
the Takings Clause required a higher level of scrutiny than the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.91 The footnote was con-
tained in the majority opinion in Nollan and has created confu-
sion for the courts that have taken it seriously. It is important to
think through the implications of footnote seven and to argue for
its rejection as a basis for rationally reviewing governmental
regulations.
VI. THE EXCEPTION TO THE CATEGORICAL RULE
In the discussion of the South Carolina Supreme Court's af-
firmation of the Beachfront Management Act, Justice Scalia
noted their reliance on a long line of Supreme Court decisions en-
joining property owners from activities akin to public nuisances. 2
An interesting shift toward a new Lochnerian93 review then en-
sued. First, the majority opinion noted that the use of the "harm-
90 In Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), Justice
Brennan cites investment-backed expectations as one factor that must be weighed. These
expectations mean something less than vested rights under which a landowner may proceed
if there have been substantial expenditures in good faith reliance on an act or omission of
government, but more than the subjective expectation of profit. Thus, in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), there is no taking through a violation of investment-
backed expectations if the property owner is put on constructive notice of the regulations.
See also. Daniel Mandelker, Investment Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987) (discussing and recommending that Takings
Clause protection be denied to a purchaser who enters a land market in which gain is
dependent on permission from a land use agency); see also Reahard v. Lee County, 978
F.2d 1131 (11 th Cir. 1992) (a post-Lucas decision that endorses the same type of review).
" See Kayden, supra note 40.
" Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2897.
93 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down New York's mini-
mum hours legislation for bakery employees, gave the era its name. Until the mid-1930s,
the Supreme Court struck down many state and federal statutes based on a substantive due
process view that stressed the fundamental right of property, a lack of deference to legisla-
tive findings, and the discovery of limits on government in principles of the common law.
See also GERALD GUNTHER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 511-527 (10th ed. 1980). Contra
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (repudiating the Lochnerian
review); Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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ful or noxious uses" principle was merely an early attempt to de-
scribe why government may, without compensation, affect
property values-"a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly
with respect to the full scope of the State's police power.""4
The Court then shifted the discussion to the difficulty of de-
termining whether a regulation prevents a harm or confers a bene-
fit. Since most situations can be seen either way, the harm/benefit
analysis could not provide a basis for determining which regula-
tions must lead to compensation and which may not.9" In search-
ing for such an objective, value-free basis, the Court quickly found
it in common law nuisance and held that only those regulations
that find a basis in the pre-existing state law of nuisance may be
exempt from the categorical rule.96 Thus, two categories of regu-
lations were established. If a regulation deprives an owner of all
economically-beneficial use, it may only be justified by common
law concepts of public nuisance. In this sense at least, the ghost of
Lochner has been revived. If a regulation does not result in a total
deprivation, it would apparently still be open to the former rules
on regulatory takings. Preparation of a defense, at the very least,
has just become more difficult.
The re-emergence of Lochner in the development of the ex-
ception was unacceptable to four of the justices. Justice Kennedy
rejected it outright and would open the basis for acceptable regu-
lations to the full scope of legislative power.9" Justice Souter
pointed out that the nuisance inquiry focuses on conduct rather
than the character of the property interest, rendering it difficult to
perceive common law nuisance as a basis for noncompensable tak-
ings.9" Justices Blackmun and Stevens strongly dissented on this
final point, noting that many of the cases did not uphold the regu-
lations based on nuisance, but rather on legislative determinations
of the public welfare.99 The retirement of Justice White and the
appointment of Justice Ginsberg in his place would seem to make
the full re-emergence of Lochnerian review unlikely.
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2897.
', Id. at 2898.
Id. at 2899.
Id. at 2902-04.
" Id. at 2925-26.
gg Id. at 2904-25.
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VII. LUCAS ONE YEAR LATER
Although the Supreme Court decision later led to a
$1,575,000 settlement for David Lucas1"' and a great deal of law
review discussion, 1 ' it has not dramatically affected takings law
at the federal or state level.1 0 2 Dwight Merriam's exhaustive re-
view of cases citing Lucas' indicates that of forty-five federal
decisions, thirty-two rejected a takings claim, eleven did not di-
rectly involve a taking, one was remanded, and only
one-involving former President Nixon's presidential pa-
pers-found a taking.104 Of the thirty-five state cases, twenty-
seven rejected the takings claim, four did not directly involve a
takings claim, one cited Lucas on the ripeness issue, one was re-
manded, and two found takings.10 5 Only one case held that the
Supreme Court had elevated the standard by which courts should
examine whether a regulation goes too far.100 In most cases, Lucas
has been cited as one of a string of cases on well-established tak-
ings law.
Two decisions, one federal and one state, specifically held
that the parcel in question is the whole parcel and refused to fol-
100 H. Jane Lehman, Accord Ends Fight Over Use of Land: Property Rights Activists
Gain in S.C. Case, WASH. POST, July 17, 1993, at El.
t01 Michael Berger, Planning Staffs "Outed" by Lucas Opinion, 44 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3 (1992); Kenneth Berlin, Just Compensation Doctrine and the Workings of
Government: The Threat from the Supreme Court and Possible Responses, 17 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 97 (1993); Michael C. Blumm et al., Viewpoints: Takings-Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 4 NAT. RESOURCES L. INST. NEWS 6 (1993); David Cal-
lies, The Lucas Case: Regulatory Takings Past, Present and Future, 44 LAND USE L &
ZONING DIG. 3 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A
Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); William W. Fisher 111, The
Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN L. REV. 1393 (1993); Jerold S. Kayden, The Lucas Case:
Old Wine in Old Bottles, 44 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3; Richard J. Lazarus, Putting
the Correct Spin on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (1993); Daniel R. Mandelker, Of Mice
and Missiles, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 285 (1993); Daniel R. Mandelker, Takings '92:
The Case of the Curious Case, 44 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1992); Patti Meeks,
Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 343 (1993); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understand-
ing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993).
£02 Dwight Merriam, No, Norman. The Sky Is Not Falling, 16 ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP. 137 (1993).
103 Id.
04 Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Merriam, supra note 102.
'0" In re William F. Gingerella, 148 B.R. 157 (D. RI. 1992).
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low Scalia's footnote seven suggestion. 0 7 In Woodbury Place
Partners v. City of Woodbury,OB a Minnesota Court of Appeals
upheld a two-year moratorium, holding that the value of the prop-
erty was delayed rather than destroyed. And in Bernardsville
Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville,°10 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court upheld local regulations on how deep an area could
be quarried, finding that there was harm to public welfare without
discussion of nuisance and refusing to set the unmined part aside
for takings consideration.
Generally, Lucas may be seen as adding some confusion to
takings law while providing possible avenues for state courts to
protect private property against regulations that these courts have
not yet utilized. The majority clearly meant Lucas to be an impor-
tant case, but the categorical rule and exception do not as yet
appear to be changing the law in any dramatic way. Joseph Sax
may be right in suggesting that:
I suspect the Court is frustrated with the takings issue. It wants
to affirm the importance of property, but it cannot find a stan-
dard that will control regulatory excess without threatening to
bring down the whole regulatory apparatus of the modern
state. "'
The impact of Lucas may be somewhat delayed, and its im-
pact on certain types of regulations may be more subtle presently.
Lucas involved an attempt to maintain property in a natural state
in the public interest. In the Beachfront Management Act, South
Carolina had, in effect, attempted to establish a public right to
ecological integrity. That concept and the emerging view of land
as part of an ecosystem rather than as private, undifferentiated
space were rejected in Lucas when the result is deprivation of pro-
ductive profit. Cases on the new ecological meaning of property
and the public right to ecological integrity that are implicit in fed-
eral and state regulatory schemes have yet to emerge. Regulators
may be largely avoiding takings claims by providing for some de-
velopment on all land, regardless of conditions. The extensive at-
tention paid to Lucas indicates that it may yet have impact on the
o' Naegele Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D.
N.C. 1992); Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa City, 492 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa 1992).
1" 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 1992)
'09 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1992)
"' Sax, supra note 101, at 1437.
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law and that, at least philosophically, it is a challenge to the ad-
vancement of modern ecological concepts of property. The chal-
lenge might best be met through the development of explicit and
sustainable legal rationales for the preservation of ecological
integrity.
